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I. INTRODUCTION
The ethical limitations on an attorney’s ability to assume financial
responsibility for an adverse attorney’s fees award against one’s client is a
topic of first impression in Texas. Because of this, attorneys who might
wish to undertake this type of fee arrangement do so at their own peril. And
while it is not currently widespread, it is possible that adopting the use of
this practice would help expand access to the courts of justice. Plaintiffs
who would otherwise forego bringing claims out of fear of being saddled
with adverse attorney’s fees awards would gain an opportunity for redress.
Critics of this practice will be quick to point out that guaranteeing adverse
attorney’s fees in a civil setting constitutes a breach of the Texas ethics rules.
However, such is not automatically the case, and interpretations such as
187
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these are a narrowly misguided approach to the rules. Therefore, it is the
purpose of this Comment to further supplement and illuminate the several
ethical underpinnings of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees in a civil
setting.
Like many states, Texas has inculcated its ethical rules within standardized
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.1 Texas patterns its disciplinary
rules off the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2
Because many other states follow a similar practice, their rules often parallel
the form and intent of the Texas rules. It is due to these similarities that
Texas can—and should—look to sister state jurisdictions for added
guidance when deciding whether to adopt the practice of contingent adverse
attorney’s fee agreements.
II. TEXAS’ RULES
A. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 1.04
Being that the scenario proposed by this Comment is a form of
contingency, Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.04 applies.3
Rule 1.04 provides the substantive regulations involving the fees that
attorneys may charge their clients.4 The rule starts off with the notion of
unconscionability and reasonableness5 and lists eight general nonexhaustive factors a court may consider when determining the
reasonableness of a fee.6 The area of the rule that is of most importance to
this analysis is found in subsection (d), and concerns itself exclusively with
contingent fees.7 Subsection (d) provides:
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service
is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (e) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined. If there is to be
1. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (outlining the disciplinary rules of professional conduct in Texas).
2. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (providing guidance
on how states should structure their disciplinary rules).
3. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04 (addressing ethical
standards relating to fees).
4. Id.
5. Id. at R. 1.04(a).
6. Id. at R. 1.04(b).
7. Id. at R. 1.04(d).
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a differentiation in the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, the percentage for each shall
be stated. The agreement shall state the litigation and other expenses to be
deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted
before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement describing the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery,
showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.8

Like the drafters of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
this Comment realizes the important role of contingency fees while also
acknowledging the precarious situation it can easily place clients in when
abused.
The main purpose of contingency fee contracts is to provide
representation to clients who would otherwise be incapable of affording
legal services.9 Contingency fees protect the client from suffering a net
financial loss should they fail to win their case.10 The upside for attorneys
is they can charge higher fees than normally incurred under an hourly or upfront fee arrangement because of this increased risk.11 This is exactly why
an attorney might choose to guarantee the risk of adverse attorney’s fees.
The higher the risk, the more reasonable it is for an attorney to charge a
higher percentage.
It is at this point where one can begin to see some of the possible issues
which might arise in contingent fee contracts. There are some, like
Professor Ted Schneyer, who might believe that contingency fees inherently
give rise to situations which are not within the best interest of clients.12 And
while these issues are certainly possible, they are not inherently likely simply
due to the nature of percentage fee agreements.

8. Id. at R. 1.04(d).
9. See Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. 2006) (citing Arthur
Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)) (explaining the ways attorneys
and courts can help indigent clients); Harold See, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee, 1984 UTAH L. REV.
485, 490 n.14 (1984); see also Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 43 (1989) (describing the justifications for contingent fee
agreements).
10. Hoover Slovacek LLP, 206 S.W.3d at 561.
11. Id. (citing Arthur Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818).
12. See Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts,
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 388–94 (1998) (prognosticating percentage contingency fee agreements give
rise to agency issues, encouragement of frivolous claims, subornation of perjury, etc.).
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The Texas Ninth Court of Appeals similarly voiced its concern for
unilateral option provisions which shift the agreement from an hourly fee
agreement to a contingent fee agreement.13 The ninth court correctly held
that unilateral option provisions lessen the legitimate justifications for
contingent fee’s higher payout.14 In the situation posited by the ninth court,
the client must pay either the hourly rate upon losing or a percentage fee
upon success. This however is a simple issue to fix through proper contract
drafting. The solution is to create a guaranteed contingency which actually
benefits the client. A representation agreement needs to merely specify that
the client will simply pay an hourly fee if his or her action is successfully
disposed of in a short enough period of time as to make a percentage fee
unconscionable.
B. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 1.08
Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.08 covers the issue of conflicts of interest as
they relate to transactions made between attorneys and their clients.15 It is
Rules 1.08(d) & (h) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
which specifically limit the modes of assistance attorneys may offer their
clients. Rule 1.08(d) states:
(d) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation or administrative proceedings, except
that: (1) a lawyer may advance or guarantee court costs, expenses of litigation
or administrative proceedings, and reasonably necessary medical and living
expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.16

Rule 1.08(h) states:
(h) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that
the lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or

13. Wythe II Corp. v. Stone, 342 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied).
14. Id.
15. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (discussing the various conflicts of interest issues that may arise in
an attorney-client relationship).
16. Id. at R. 1.08(d).
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expenses; and (2) contract in a civil case with a client for a contingent fee that
is permissible under Rule 1.04.17

Case law surrounding the application of these provisions is sparse, and
the Texas Supreme Court has yet to give much detailed analysis of the
correct application of Rule 1.08(d).18 It is Rule 1.08(d) that would provide
the crux of the guarantee of adverse attorney’s fees. However, a fuller
understanding of both the underlying historical considerations and how
Rule 1.08 intersects with the other disciplinary rules is required before
discussing the specifics of how this practice would work.
C. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 7.03
Texas Disciplinary Rule 7.03(e) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not pay,
give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not licensed to
practice law for soliciting or referring prospective clients for professional
employment . . . .”19 The rule goes on to say in subsection (f) that “[a]
lawyer shall not, for the purpose of securing employment, pay, give,
advance, or offer to pay, give, or advance anything of value to a prospective
client, other than actual litigation expenses and other financial assistance
permitted by Rule 1.08([e]) . . . .”20 It must be emphatically stated that the
suggested practice of guaranteeing an award of adverse attorney’s fees is not
to be used as a lure by attorneys fishing for clients.
D. Disciplinary Rule of Conduct 8.04(a)(9)
Texas Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(9) states that a lawyer shall not “engage
in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state[.]”21
Barratry, as far as Rule 8.04 is concerned,22 is defined under Section 38.12
17. Id. at R. 1.08(h).
18. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 542, 2002 WL 405093 (2002) (stating without
explanation or authorities, besides Rule 1.08(d), that “[a] fee arrangement with an insurance company
under which the lawyer is required to pay the costs and expenses of litigation, regardless of the outcome
of the litigation, would constitute a violation of Rule 1.08(d) . . . .”).
19. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03(e).
20. Id. at R. 7.03(f).
21. Id. at R. 8.04(a)(9).
22. Like champerty and maintenance, barratry is a nearly ancient common law crime that
involves “[v]exatious incitement to litigation, esp. by soliciting potential legal clients.” Barratry,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see Neese v. Lyon, 479 S.W.3d 368, 382 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.) (allowing clients to bring suit “to avoid contingency-fee agreements procured by
barratry and seek the remedy of rescission and restitution”); see generally Solicitation and Barratry,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForLawyers/Grievan
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of the Texas Penal Code.23 Among other inapplicable violations,
Section 38.12 provides that a person commits a barratry offense if he or she
“pays, gives, or advances or offers to pay, give, or advance to a prospective
client money or anything of value to obtain employment as a professional
from the prospective client[.]”24 However, the only way in which an
attorney could execute the practice proposed here would be under a
contingent fee agreement which meets the requirements of Rule 1.04.
Subsequently, any client who could receive the benefit of this practice would
be a current—rather than a prospective—client. This practice is not to be
used as a means of soliciting clients. Rather, it should be used as a means
of protecting existing clients from the threat of adverse attorney’s fees, thus
expanding access to justice, most especially for indigent clients.
Furthermore, as there is a prosecutorial exception for conduct which is
authorized by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,25 there
is a necessity for the guaranteeing of adverse attorney’s fees to be explicitly
approved by the Texas Supreme Court.26
Barratry is still an all too common issue in Texas, and has even been
litigated over while this Comment was being written.27 The Texas
Legislature saw fit to enact Section 82.0651 of the Texas Government Code,
entitled “Civil Liability for Prohibited Barratry.”28 Under Section 82.0651,
a person who is found to be in violation of either the Penal Code29 or
Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct30 can be assessed a $10,000
penalty, actual damages springing from their conduct, and attorney’s fees.31

ceandEthics/SolicitationandBarratry/default.htm [https://perma.cc/6KV5-PZJ2](summarizing the
relevant provisions and prohibitions under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct).
23. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12 (providing a series of violations which
constitute barratry); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 623, 76 Tex. B.J. 823 (2013) (discussing the
prohibition of barratry and solicitation).
24. PENAL § 38.12.
25. Id. § 38.12(c); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 623, 76 Tex. B.J. 823 (2013).
26. See Medlock v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 24 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. App—Texarkana
2000, no pet.) (upholding a twelve-month suspension and a fine of $3,000 as attorney’s fees for
committing a Rule 7.07(a) & 8.04(a)(9) violation via written solicitation).
27. See generally Sullo v. Kubosh, 616 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.)
(litigating three consolidated barratry cases with at least seventy-four plaintiffs).
28. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.0651; Sullo, 616 S.W.3d at 875.
29. PENAL § 38.12.
30. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.,
tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A.
31. GOV’T § 82.0651(b).
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III. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Constitutional Values Invoked
As previously mentioned, the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct are
based on the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. However, in order to fully appreciate the historical significance of
the concepts at hand, one must have a more in-depth idea of how the
current ABA rules came about. The current rules were first adopted by the
American Bar Association House of Delegates in 198332 which replaced the
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.33 The Model Rules have
frequently been revisited.34
Those who cast dispersions against the notion put forth by this Comment
fail to realize that the underpinnings of this notion span much wider than
any state codes or the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Constitution of the State of Texas has existed throughout history in six
separate iterations.35 In every version there has contained an open courts
provision consisting of identical words.36 The open courts provision reads,
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law.”37 While it is certain that the
freedoms enshrined in the Texas Constitution significantly predate the
adoption of even the Canons of Professional Ethics, one must look deeper into
the tides of history to understand the true import of the open courts
doctrine.

32. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (showcasing the
current rules issued by the ABA).
33. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969) (serving as ABA’s model
rules before being replaced by the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
34. The Model Code was in turn preceded by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.; see also CANNON OF PROF’L ETHICS (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1908) (showing
how the Model Code evolved into its current form).
35. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 n.4 (Tex. 1986) (“Texas has had six constitutions:
The Republic Constitution of 1836, the Statehood Constitution of 1845, the Confederate Constitution
of 1861, the Union Constitution of 1866, the Reconstruction Constitution of 1869, and the present
Post-Reconstruction Constitution of 1876.”); see GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 2 (1977) (highlighting the
evolution of the bill of rights through the six versions of the Texas Constitution).
36. LeCory, 713 S.W.2d at 339; BRADEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 2.
37. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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The open courts doctrine in the Texas Constitution is derived in large
part from the Magna Carta.38 The provision, which protects a remedy for
every person by due course of law, does not create any new rights by itself,
but rather, it highlights a principle of law which predates the English
common law.39 Despite being removed from the Magna Carta’s40 signing
by over half a millennia, Texas has been outright in its adoption of the values
inculcated within the Magna Carta.41 The open courts doctrine found in
every version of the Texas Constitution is a derivation of the great liberties
first guaranteed by the Magna Carta in 1215.42 The Texas Supreme Court
has itself stated on separate occasions that “[a]ll grants of power are to be
interpreted in the light of the maxims of Magna Charta and the Common
Law as transmuted into the Bill of Rights[]”43 and “[t]he open courts
provision’s history also reflects its significance . . . . Colonists brought to
America and then to Texas their belief in the historic rights guaranteed by
Magna Carta.”44
The impact of the Magna Carta on Texas law is incalculable. It was
directly relied upon when drafting the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of

38. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 interp. commentary (West 2007).
39. Id.
40. For those rusty on their English history, the Magna Carta has been a cornerstone of western
legal history for over eight centuries. Its inception came out of a civil rebellion against King John I
which took place in 1215. What is Magna Carta?, BRITISH LIBRARY, https://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/videos/what-is-magna-carta# [https://perma.cc/6BJU-J3FA] (discussing the history behind the
Magna Carta as well as its importance in today’s legal traditions). Fed up at the King’s immense taxes
to fuel costly foreign wars, combined with his tyrannical disregard for the law, the barons of England
took hold of London and captured the King. Id. This forced King John to sign into law certain rights
and protections of the people. Id. The Magna Carta was the first major example of limiting the power
of the sovereign in western history. Id.
41. Vincent Johnson, The Great Charter A Look at the History and Texas Legacy of the Magna Carta,
Which Celebrates Its 800th Anniversary This Year, 78 TEX. B.J. 266, 266 (2015).
42. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986) (citing BRADEN ET AL., supra
note 35, at 77) (providing a mechanism for the open courts doctrine to be used in modern day courts);
see also Johnson, supra note 41, at 267 (quoting LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339) (explaining the use of the
open courts doctrine).
43. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (Tex. 1921); see also Johnson, supra note 41,
at 267 (quoting Spann, 235 S.W. at 515) (expressing the continuing use of the open courts doctrine).
44. LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339 (citing BRADEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 3; see Johnson, supra
note 41, at 267 (quoting LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339) (discussing the use of the open courts doctrine by
the Texas Supreme Court).
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Texas.45 Furthermore, it was similarly used as a foundation for the Texas
Bill of Rights.46
The open courts doctrine stems from chapter 40 of the Magna Carta,
which reads in English “[t]o no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay
right or justice.”47 While the concept of the open courts doctrine cannot
be found in the United States Constitution, it has nonetheless “been a part
of our constitutional law since our republic.”48 It can be said with much
historical foundation that the open courts doctrine as well as the very
concept of due process “are rooted in the Magna Carta and represent a ‘basic
consensus in our society about how government should act.’”49
B. The English System
Having established the palpable impact of the Magna Carta on Texas law,
it becomes necessary to point out a harmful concept in English law—known
as the “English rule” of recovery. Under the English system, the losing
party must pay the attorney’s fees of the opposing side.50 While this
“winner takes all” type of recovery method might seem the fairer way to go,
it is indeed not. Our learned founders saw the crippling effect the English
system could have on losing parties, as well as the chilling effect it had on
plaintiffs bringing suit. In response to this, the “American rule” dictates
that each party pays its own way with limited exceptions51 which were

45. Johnson, supra note 41, at 267; Jadd F. Masso, Mind the Gap: Expansion of Texas Governmental
Immunity Between Takings and Tort, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 265, 272 (2005).
46. Johnson, supra note 41, at 267; Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of
Rights, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 93, 119 (1988).
47. English Translation of Magna Carta, Brit. Libr., https://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation [perma.cc/T7LJ-5TQ5] (furnishing a full-text
translation of the Magna Carta) [hereinafter Magna Carta].
48. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988); see Johnson, supra note 41, at 267
(affirming the continuity of the open courts doctrine into modern law).
49. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring) (quoting
BRADEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 51).
50. The power to award attorney’s fees and costs has existed for centuries in the English Court
of Chancery. See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 240 (8th Cir. 1928) (citing
Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1917)) (expressing the inequity in the English system).
51. In particular circumstances, an admiralty plaintiff can receive attorney’s fees, though they
are technically considered to be included in compensatory damages. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)).
Attorney’s fees have been awarded in anti-discrimination suits as well. Rolax v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co.,
186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951).
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inherited from the common law52 and later expanded. The traditional
exceptions being: cases of gross misconduct and fraud which were not
sustained; where the basis of the suit is “false, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or
oppressive and so shown to be[;]”53 or for breach of fiduciary duty.54 The
American rule stretches all the way back to the foundation of our republic.55
As early as 1796, the Supreme Court of the United States held against an
award of attorney’s fees and required the parties to pay their own fees,
stating: “The general practice of the United States is in opposition to [the
general award of attorney’s fees]; and even if that practice were not strictly
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed,
or modified, by statute.”56 Rather than reversing this approach, the
Legislature chose instead to codify the American rule by act of Congress in
1853.57

52. Russel v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437 (1881) (“But the Circuit Court of the United States . . .
[is governed by] the rules of practice prescribed by this court and by the Circuit Court not inconsistent
therewith; and, . . . by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England prevailing when the
equity rules were adopted . . . . Equity Rule 90.”); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. 425, 430 (1868) (“The equity
jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England
possesses . . . .”); Fountain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 384 (1854) (“The courts of the United States cannot
exercise any equity powers, except those conferred by acts of [C]ongress, and those judicial powers
which the high court of chancery in England . . . possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation
of the [C]onstitution of the United States.”); Guardian Trust Co., 28 F.2d at 240 (citation omitted) (“The
United States courts of equity at the time of their creation became endowed with the powers, including
that over costs, possessed by the English Chancery Court.”).
53. Guardian Trust Co., 28 F.2d at 241.
54. It should be noted that at least in Texas—unlike in other jurisdictions—attorney’s fees are
generally unrecoverable for breaches of fiduciary duty. See Messier v. Messier, 458 S.W.3d 155, 165
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Hollister v. Maloney, Martin & Mitchell LLP,
No. 14-12-00529-CV, 2013 WL 2149823 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] May 16, 2013, no pet.))
(expressing the oppressive nature of the “winner take all” mentality); see also W. Reserve Life Assur.
Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360, 377 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (exploring the
unjust nature of the English rule).
55. Daniel H. Fehderau, Comment, Rule 11 and the Court’s Inherent Power to Shift Attorney’s Fees:
An Analysis of Their Competing Objectives and Applications, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 701, 702–03 (1993).
56. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796); see id. at 703 (highlighting the Supreme
Court’s consistent reaffirmation of the American rule); Sande L. Buhai, Everyone Makes Mistakes:
Attorney’s Fee Recovery in Legal Malpractice Suits, 6 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 32, 48 (2016)
(describing the more than 200-year roots of the American rule).
57. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 171, 10 Stat. 161 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923
(1988)); Fehderau, supra note 55, at 703 (1993) (highlighting the change in previous rules to modern
law); Buhai, supra note 56, at 48 (underscoring the change to modern law enacted by Congress).
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The most important issue surrounding the English system for this
Comment is the loss of access to the courts litigants face.58 The English
legal system seems to loathe litigation and will punish anyone who dares
bring an unsuccessful claim to court.59 Courts under the English rule value
settlement and deterrence over litigation and access to the courts.60
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the American rule, opining in
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.61 that “since litigation is at
best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included
the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”62 Furthermore, the Court noted that
the labor, time, expense, and difficulty in properly determining what a
“reasonable” attorney’s fees award should be in every case would create
“substantial burdens for judicial administration.”63
Though on the rise in America, awards of adverse attorney’s fees are an
institutionally disfavored practice and are relatively uncommon.64 In order
to overcome the general rule against adverse attorney’s fees there usually
must be overriding considerations of justice which warrant such a
practice.65 This said, Texas has followed the path of other states by
legislatively expanding the loser pay system for certain statutory
58. Allison F. Aranson, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform From
an International Perspective, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 755, 774 (1992) (“[T]he structure of the British system did
deny parties access to justice whether or not they had meritorious claims.”); Michael Napier,
Counterpoint: For Many, English Rule Impedes Access to Justice, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1992, at A17
(“Essentially the English Rule requires the loser in a lawsuit to pay the winner’s attorney fees and court
costs . . . . The plaintiff who cannot risk paying everyone’s legal costs effectively forfeits his or her
access to justice. Thus the litigation disincentive sometimes caused by the English Rule has more to
do with the client’s fear of costs than worry about the merits of the claim.”); Edward F. Sherman, From
“Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgement Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1863, 1863 (1998) (“Perhaps the strongest historical justification for the American rule is centered
in the American faith in liberal access to the courts for righting wrongs.”).
59. See Aranson, supra note 58, at 774 (“British courts employ clear categorical rules and adhere
rigidly to stare decisis, aiding out of court settlements and guarding against change and experimentation
in the courtroom.”).
60. Id.
61. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
62. Id. at 718 (citing Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964)).
63. Id. (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 231 (1872)).
64. See David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the
“American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REV. 583, 584–85 (2005) (discussing
the history of the “American rule” for adverse attorney fees).
65. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718.
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violations.66 While it is true that under the American system plaintiffs are
not truly made whole with awards of consequential damages, this is not an
issue which has bearing on this discussion.67
There are those who feel that the British system is a more equitable and
expedient system. Those who propose this notion fail to consider the
coercion that goes on in the British system towards indigent plaintiffs with
otherwise meritorious claims. The same motivation felt by opposing parties
of similar or at least moderate wealth are disproportionately impactful on
indigent clients. Proponents of the “loser pays” mentality claim that the
English system discourages parties from dragging out litigation in order to
induce settlement.68 The bottom line is that the English rule is manifestly
unfair. It brings with it an undue hardship on those who lose their case.
For plaintiffs who cannot prove their cause it creates liability when there has
been no wrongdoing, and for defendants it adds insult to injury. Despite all
its reforms, the English legal system is still based on the notion that all claims
which fail to win are inherently unmeritorious.
Adverse attorney’s fees are just as damaging to those they are imposed
upon regardless of whether they stem from some state or federal statutory
provision, or due to a specific contract clause. The important thing to take
away from the English rule is it has a deleterious effect on its target, as well
as a prospective one to the courts through intimidation of plaintiffs.
Conveniently, for anyone making such a claim it is difficult to determine the
metrics of how many plaintiffs fail to bring otherwise legitimate lawsuits
simply because they are indigent and petrified of financial ruin.
Allowing for the practice of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fee awards
would insulate plaintiffs and defendants from the harsh nature of the
English rule.69 Attorneys would simply analyze the facts surrounding each
individual case and make a determination of the likely outcome. While there
are those that might say allowing for this practice might well lead to
attorneys pushing harder on their clients to settle early, this is non-sequitur
66. Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney’s Fees: Expanding the “Loser Pays”
Rule in Texas, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1915, 1937 (1994); Buhai, supra note 56, at 51–67 (detailing the main
categories in which adverse attorney’s fees awards are upheld).
67. Michael C. Moore, Legal Malpractice and the Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule: A Suggested
Approach for Addressing Intentional Lawyer Misconduct, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1152 (1991).
68. Aranson, supra note 58, at 779.
69. See Napier, supra note 58, at A17 (“It is hard to imagine how in the [United States] any
individual or business, short of a corporate giant, can afford to risk the result of an English rule award
of costs. In England, the system has survived primarily because of a government-funded Legal Aid
scheme, which cushions the effect the rule has on many losing plaintiffs.”).
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of sorts. In a normal situation where defendants are faced with the threat
of adverse attorney’s fees, there are only two good options: (1) prevail on
the merits and avoid an adverse award; or (2) settle early so opposing
counsel’s fees are lower. In the end it comes down to allocating the risk on
the attorneys rather than the clients. Indigent clients are already more
vulnerable and less likely to take a case to trial as it is, so adopting this safety
net would be a meaningful way to open-up access to the courts of justice.
The judiciary has an interest in making sure that all parties in a possible
lawsuit have access to the courts. Allowing for the guarantee of adverse
attorney’s fees expands access to the courts in exchange for a nominal
expansion of contingency fee agreements. Such an expansion is unlikely to
lead to disciplinary violations that are not already provided for in the current
ethical regulations.
IV. MECHANISMS THAT DISCOURAGE ABUSE OF
CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENTS
A. Fee Forfeiture
There are a number of remedial measures that have been put in place to
ensure attorneys do not abuse their discretion in accepting contingent fee
clients. The strongest of these remedies is arguably fee forfeiture,70 which
has been put in place “to protect relationships of trust by discouraging
agents’ disloyalty.”71 However, only serious and clear violations of duty will
be actionable.72 Courts consider “the gravity and timing of the violation,
its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer’s work for the client, any
other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other
remedies” when determining seriousness.73 Clear violations are those
70. See Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570, 587 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.) (citing
Burrow v. Acre, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237, 246 (Tex. 1999)) (outlining when a court may order forfeiture
of a fee); Izen v. Laine, 614 S.W.3d 775, 791(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing
First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 221–22 (Tex. 2017))
(highlighting when fee forfeiture may be awarded as an equitable remedy).
71. Wythe II Corp. v. Stone, 342 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied)
(quoting Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 238).
72. Id. (citing Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (AM. L. INST. 2021) (“[A] lawyer is civilly liable to a client if the lawyer
breaches a fiduciary duty to the client set forth in § 16(3) and if that failure is a legal cause of injury
within the meaning of § 53, unless the lawyer has a defense within the meaning of § 54.”).
73. Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 243; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 49.
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where a “reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts and law reasonably
accessible to the lawyer, would have known that the conduct was
wrongful.”74
The trial court decides whether forfeiture is appropriate.75 The court’s
primary consideration in deciding this is “whether forfeiture is necessary to
satisfy the public’s interest in protecting the attorney-client relationship.”76
The Restatement gives the court wide discretion in crafting a forfeiture
remedy.77 Even though the immediate goal of this remedy is to safeguard
the public’s confidence in attorney-client relationships, forfeiture is still
capable of providing direct compensation to clients.78 It should be noted
that Texas has approved section 49 of the Restatement, along with most
other jurisdictions who have considered like issues.79
B. Frivolous Claims
Professor Schneyer opined in his article, Legal-Process Constraints on the
Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts, that contingent fee agreements
breed incentive for bringing frivolous lawsuits.80 However, the learned
professor himself discredits this notion by acknowledging the universal
reality that attorneys utilizing contingent fees “will generally have stronger
incentives than hourly-rate lawyers to reject weak cases.”81 It is not within
the economic interest of a contingent-fee attorney to take frivolous claims,
as they are inherently unlikely to prevail.82 Furthermore, besides the risk of
74. Wythe II Corp., 342 S.W.3d at 104 (quoting Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49, cmt. d (AM. L. INST., Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996))).
75. Id. at 105 (citing Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 246); see also Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard,
282 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. 2008) (detailing the appropriate measure of forfeiture).
76. Wythe II Corp., 342 S.W.3d at 105 (quoting Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 246).
77. See Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241–42 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)) (“The remedy
of this Section should hence be applied with discretion.”).
78. Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 243–44.
79. Id. at 242 (detailing with great depth the various jurisdictions that have adopted the
restatement approach).
80. Schneyer, supra note 12, at 388–89.
81. Id. at 389–90 (reproducing empirical data which shows contingent lawyers substantially filter
unmeritorious claims out of the court system).
82. See Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, The Impact of Frivolous Lawsuits on Deterrence: Do They
Have Some Redeeming Value?, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 301, 305 (2014) (explaining the Supreme Court’s
view on what a frivolous claim may be described as); see also Frivolous, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019) (defining “frivolous” as “[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 110 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2021) (“A frivolous position is one that
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gaining nothing upon defeat in a contingency case, lawyers who bring
frivolous claims are subject to both tort damages83 and sanctions.84
In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a claim of malicious prosecution in a
civil case, the plaintiff has the burden to prove and establish: “(1) the
institution or continuation of civil proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) by
or at the insistence of the defendant; (3) malice in the commencement of
the proceeding; (4) lack of probable cause for the proceeding;
(5) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; and (6) special
damages.”85 The last of the elements listed—special damages—has also
been referred to as “special injury.”86 The designation of “special damages”
is meant to differentiate them from “the ordinary losses incident to
defending a civil suit, such as inconvenience, embarrassment, discovery
costs, and attorney’s fees.”87
Texas has provided, in Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
that:
Attorneys or parties who shall bring a fictitious suit as an experiment to get
an opinion of the court, or who shall file any fictitious pleading in a cause for
such a purpose, or shall make statements in pleading which they know to be
groundless and false, for the purpose of securing a delay of the trial of the
cause, shall be held guilty of a contempt. If a pleading, motion or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction

a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no substantial
possibility that the tribunal would accept it.”).
83. Airgas-Sw., Inc. v. IWS Gas & Supply of Tex., Ltd., 390 S.W.3d 472, 478 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex.
1996) (recognizing the tort of malicious prosecution in Texas).
84. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (concerning sanctions for frivolous lawsuits); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 10.002 (providing for motions for sanctions to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
associated with frivolous litigation); Id. § 27.009(b) (“If the court finds that a motion to dismiss filed
under this chapter is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court may award costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees to the responding party.”). It should be noted that statutes such as this would directly
contradict the practice being suggested in this Comment. Should an attorney wish to guarantee the
threat of adverse attorney’s fees it would be illogical for them to violate a statute which clearly provides
for the awarding of adverse attorney’s fees when violated.
85. Airgas-Sw., Inc., 390 S.W.3d at 478 (quoting Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 207); see also
Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 792 n.3 (Tex. 2006) (listing congruent requirements
to that of Airgas to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim).
86. Id. (citing Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 892 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)).
87. Id. (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co., 921 S.W.2d at 208).
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available under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both.88

Indeed, it is a flimsy shield both counsel and client hide behind if they think
the simple nature of a contingency fee agreement will insulate them from
the swift rebuke of the court should they bring forth a frivolous lawsuit.89
Texas courts have been known in the past to inflict harsh penalties on those
who bring frivolous claims.90
C. Strong-Arming Clients and Rule 1.02 Violations
Apart from fee forfeiture, clients are also protected under both the Model
Rules91 and the Texas rules.92 Rule 1.02 of the Texas rules concerns the
scope and objectives of representation. Subsection (a) of 1.02 states:
(a) Subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e), (f), and (g), a lawyer shall abide
by a client’s decisions: (1) concerning the objectives and general methods of
representation; (2) whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter, except
as otherwise authorized by law; (3) In a criminal case, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether
the client will testify.93

Subject to this, attorneys risk disciplinary hearings against them if they
subvert the client’s control over the substantive matters of a case.94 There
are those who might feel the guarantee of paying an adverse attorney’s fee
award creates too high of a risk that attorneys will strong-arm their clients
into settlement to avoid paying out higher fees. However, these fears are
largely faulty. It is clear and unequivocal in Texas that clients make the

88. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
89. Cf. Schneyer, supra note 12, at 389 (“The argument that contingent fees encourage frivolous
claims by freeing clients of all fee obligations when a case fails begins to seem frivolous itself when one
considers the incentives the fees create for lawyers.”).
90. See, e.g., Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied) (affirming a $100,000 sanction for bringing a frivolous claim).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“[A] lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4,
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. . . . A lawyer shall abide
by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”).
92. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A.
93. Id.
94. See id. (outlining violations that would result in sanctions for an attorney).
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substantive decisions in their cases. Courts have repeatedly invalidated
contingency fee agreements which force the client to procure his or her
attorney’s approval before accepting a settlement offer, as these are against
public policy.95 Any attorney who strongarms a client into a settlement will
risk landing in hot water with the state bar’s disciplinary board.96
V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. Interest in the Cause of Litigation
There are those97 who believe for an attorney to guarantee the possibility
of adverse attorney’s fees awards makes them “acquire a proprietary interest
in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation . . . .”98 While it is
curious that Oklahoma’s Rule 1.8(e) significantly mirrors Texas’99, its
reasoning behind the rule is flawed. In the Oklahoma Bar Association Legal
Ethics Committee’s Ethics Opinion 323, the Oklahoma Bar Association
makes a critical error in judgement by ruling that indemnifying clients
against the threat of adverse attorney’s fees awards gives an attorney an
unethical proprietary interest in the cause of action.100
The committee took too narrow a view of the practice of adverse
attorney’s fee indemnification. Should an attorney choose to make a
contractual agreement with a rationally informed client where the parties
agree the attorney shall indemnify the client of any adverse attorney’s fees,

95. In re Plaza, 363 B.R. 517, 521–22 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting Lewis v. S.S. Baume,
534 F.2d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1976)); Davis Law Firm v. Bates, No. 13-13-00209-CV,
2014 WL 585855, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 13, 2014, no pet.).
96. See 25 Texas Lawyers Gone Rogue, the December 2019 List of Judges and Texas Lawyer Sanctions &
The 20 Bad Attorneys Who are Privately Disciplined, LAWS IN TEXAS (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://lawsintexas.com/25-texas-lawyers-gone-rogue-the-december-2019-list-of-judges-texas-lawyer
-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/32C2-42X5] (detailing the various sanctions, suspensions, and
reprimands given by the Texas Bar Disciplinary Actions committee in 2019, three of which are for
violations of Rule 1.02).
97. The great state of Oklahoma is who I refer to here. See generally Okla. Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009) (explaining the Oklahoma Bar Association’s approach to
adverse attorney’s fee indemnification).
98. OKLA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j); see Okla. Comm. On Legal Ethics, Op. 323,
2009 WL 806564 (arguing “[n]o exception is made for an indemnification agreement[]” to the general
prohibitions of Rule 1.8(j)).
99. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(h) with OKLA. RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (highlighting the similarities between the Texas and Oklahoma Rules of
Professional Conduct).
100. Okla. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009).

204

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:186

such an agreement ought to be upheld on both the principles of public
policy towards securing representation and the freedom to contract. The
committee chose instead to bandy words, focusing on semantics rather than
form. It felt that the term “indemnify” was inapplicable to a contingency
fee agreement, as there can be, in their opinion, “no expectation of
repayment under any circumstances.”101 This is an unpersuasive argument
when one applies common sense rationality to it. An attorney who
guarantees the threat of adverse attorney’s fees is not advancing anything at
the time the contract is signed. They are simply adding to the contingency
already being created in the agreement.
The Oklahoma Committee failed to adequately show that attorneys who
choose to indemnify their clients of the threat of adverse attorney’s fees are
therefore more likely to either exert an undue influence or otherwise subvert
the legal system in order to avoid their contractual obligations. Instead, they
chose to focus on form over substance. However, it should be mentioned
that the committee raised an interesting point: the common law offenses of
champerty and maintenance.102
The offense of champerty and maintenance is nearly as old as the common
law itself, and traces its heritage all the way back to the time of Edward I.103
It is defined as a “bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by
which the stranger pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving
part of any judgment proceeds.”104 While the roots of this offense stretch
all the way back to the heralded constitution of Roman Emperor Anastasius
in 506 A.D., it has fallen largely by the wayside in light of more modern
causes of action.105
Even as far back as 1905 it was recognized that the common law interests
behind these offenses had given way to the more appropriate consideration
of contract legality.106 Historically, these offenses were envisioned to
protect against great lords intimidating the courts through the meddling
and/or purchasing of an interest in litigation which did not pertain to

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, 18 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222 (1905).
104. Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543 (1996) (footnote omitted)
(analyzing with great detail the history of champerty and maintenance).
105. Id. at 1545 (quoting an excerpt from the constitution of Anastasius historian Max Radin
found in Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 55 (1935)).
106. Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, supra note 103, at 223.
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them.107 Luckily enough, today, our modern requirements of standing are
quite sufficient to keep those who have no business in a case from involving
themselves.
The comment, Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, while no longer
indicative of modern views, is still important for the purposes of this
discussion.108 While not only acting as a looking glass into the infancy of
contingency fee agreements, the comment raised the legitimate notion that
in the American court system there are few—if any—legitimately overriding
public policy interests involving champerty and maintenance that ought to
trump an otherwise valid and enforceable contract.109 While it is not the
position of this Comment that the remaining laws against champerty-esque
violations of public policy be overturned, it is firmly its contention that this
ancient common law notion ought not interfere with contracts which
further public policy. When one thinks of the reasons why champerty and
maintenance ought not to be allowed to interfere here, the oft quoted jurist
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. comes to mind:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.110

Once again, the Oklahoma Committee failed to recognize the reality of
the situation. There is a well-developed corpus of legal reasoning which
shows the common law offenses of champerty and maintenance are largely
defunct and have been replaced.111 The overwhelming force of legal
research and jurisprudence shows it is the validity of the contract itself which
should take precedence when determining the overall validity of the
agreement. The committee merely points to the possibility of abuse by
attorneys, rather than being able to show documented proof of such
occurrence.
107. Id.
108. See generally id. (discussing and analyzing twentieth century views on champerty and
maintenance).
109. Id.
110. Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
111. See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 24 (2020) (explaining the reasoning behind
replacing champerty and maintenance from modern law); see also 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:1
(4th ed. 2021) (providing the case illustration of Papageorge v. Banks, 81 A.3d 311 (D.C. 2013) for
champerty).

206

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:186

The Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee, on the other hand, has a
more correct stance on the issue of contingently agreeing to guarantee
adverse attorney’s fees.112 The Alaska Committee was given the question
of “whether a plaintiff’s attorney, who has a defense verdict returned in a
contingency fee case, is ethically permitted to agree to pay the attorney fee
award against his or her client, should an appeal of the verdict be
unsuccessful.”113 The committee based its decision on interpretation of
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(e) and (j).114
The committee went on to comment that 1.8(j) is the “traditional rule”
used to prohibit an attorney from acquiring a proprietary interest in the
cause of litigation, and that the comments note it is based on the common
law rules concerning champerty and maintenance.115 The committee took
a real-world approach to the issue, and concluded that there was “no
practical or rational basis for excluding an attorney fee award from the
definition of ‘expenses of litigation.’”116 I share the opinion of the Alaska
Committee that agreements, such as the one posited, are either actually or
practically indistinguishable from other bona fide contingency
agreements.117
The Oklahoma Committee critiqued Alaska’s interpretation of their own
rules for not assigning what Oklahoma believes to be the proper distinction
between “advances” and “payments.”118 The Oklahoma Committee dug
its heels in around the notion that an advance must carry with it the
expectation of repayment.119 The committee failed to give equal weight to
the entire rule, which goes on to say at the very end “the repayment of which
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”120 It is odd that the
committee would take such a narrow view of Rule 1.8(e), choosing to place
an unbalanced importance on the Meriam Webster denotation of “advance”
rather than assigning the clear and plain meaning of the four corners of the
rule itself in equal measure.
112. Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *1 (2004).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *2
116. Id.
117. Id. (“The Committee is also of the opinion that an attorney’s agreement to pay an attorney
fee award, is a natural extension of, or at least not sufficiently distinguishable from, a traditional and
permissible contingency fee agreement.”).
118. Okla. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009) at *2.
119. Id.
120. OKLA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e).
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Read as a whole, the rules of Texas, Alaska, and Oklahoma clearly support
the notion that the so-called expectation of repayment which the Oklahoma
Committee placed such importance on can be nested within, and thereby
subsumed by the contingency that the client will be successful.121 The
Oklahoma Committee took too narrow a view of the history behind both
their rule and the ABA Model Rules.122 Alaska on the other hand
accounted for the complex and important considerations of whether this
would constitute an impermissible loan by the attorney, the possible
negative impact on client’s pre-filing merits, the implications of Alaska Rule
of Civil Procedure 82 (which promotes avoiding protracted litigation and
seeks settlement), the risks of frivolous litigation, the threat of compromised
attorney loyalty, or overreaching due to counsel’s economic self-interest.123
These considerations yield a more logically persuasive argument than that
given by the Oklahoma Committee.
B. Colorado’s Approach
The Supreme Court of Colorado sat en banc when it faced a similar
attorney’s fee issue during a particularly litigious dispute in Mercantile
Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C. v. Flood. 124 This case involved a trial attorney who
paid an up-front fee to his client’s appellate attorneys, repayment of which
was contingent on a favorable appeal.125 When the appeals court awarded
attorney’s fees opposing counsel appealed once again, claiming that the
award was impermissible under the Colorado Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.8(e). They claimed that the payment of appellate attorney’s fees
by the trial attorney “violated the ethics rules against providing financial
assistance to clients . . . .”126

121. Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *1 (2004); Okla. Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009) at *2.
122. Okla. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 323, 2009 WL 806564 (2009), at *3 (“Rule 1.8(e) was
amended in 1993. The 1993 language (set forth in Part I. above) tracks amendments to ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and is the current rule.”).
123. Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *2 (2004).
124. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C. v. Flood, 278 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2012) (en banc).
125. Id. at 350.
126. Id. at 354.
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Rule 1.8(e) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct is very similar
in both language and intent to its Texas counterpart, differing only in that
the Texas rule includes the term “guarantee” in 1.08(d)(1).127
The Colorado Supreme Court then made the important note that the
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct seek to further the equal access of
justice towards all litigants.128 The preamble to the Colorado rules even
states that lawyers should “be mindful of deficiencies in the administration
of justice” and should take into consideration that the poor and middle class
alike sometimes cannot afford adequate counsel.129 The preamble goes on,
in section 6, to say that lawyers should devote themselves to “ensure equal
access” to our justice system for those who are socially and economically
barred from the courts.130
The Colorado Supreme Court then went on to splice together the
interplay between the use of contingency fees and the advancement of court
costs and the expenses of litigation.131 The court chose to take the opposite
view to Oklahoma, concluding that the rule “is ultimately defined by its
exception distinguishing between permissible and impermissible types of
financial assistance to clients, rather than its preliminary unequivocal
prohibition against providing financial assistance to clients.”132 The court
next took the approach of the Oklahoma Committee and parsed out the
language of the exception to resolve the distinctions “between permissible
and impermissible expenses.”133
Instead of focusing on the semantics behind the word “advance,” the
court took a plain meaning approach to the terms “expense” and
“litigation.” The court defined expense as “[a]n expenditure of money, time,

127. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., TIT. 2, SUBTIT. G, APP. A, with COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (highlighting
the subtle difference between the Texas and Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct).
128. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C, 278 P.3d at 355. Compare COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6
(“Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to
person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or
delay.”), with TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done
him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”).
129. COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT PMBL. § 6.
130. Id.
131. See Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C., 278 P.3d at 355 (discussing the similar reasons the
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct permit contingency fee arrangements and advancements of
court costs and litigation expenses).
132. Id. at 356.
133. Id.
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labor, or resources to accomplish a result.”134 Litigation was denoted as
“[t]he process of carrying on a lawsuit.”135 Construing these terms in
context, the court found that an expense of litigation constitutes “an
expenditure of money, time, labor, or resources to accomplish the process
of carrying on a lawsuit.”136
Weighing the considerations in balance, the court determined that
“[c]ontingent fees and advancement of litigation expenses are permitted as
exceptions to the rule prohibiting financial assistance to clients because,
despite their potential to create conflicts of interest, they ensure access to
the courts.”137 It was ultimately decided that the purpose of the
expenditure was the controlling factor, not the means of repayment.138 The
court found that as long as an expense is rationally related to conducting
litigation, it will fit within the exception.139 However, unlike the Texas
approach, loans for living expenses and other such things are still
impermissible in Colorado regardless of contingent repayment.140 Relying
on many different sources the court upheld the award in its 5–2 decision.141
The approach of the Colorado Supreme Court is a more learned and bona
fide analysis. The court not only took a plain meaning approach to the rule,
but also considered the overall public policies involved in contingent fee
agreements.142 Taking the open courts doctrine to heart, the court decided
that the goal of open access to justice would be hampered by the curtailment
of attorney’s fees guarantees.143 The court deftly deemed that disallowing
the award of otherwise reasonable attorney’s fees upon successful appeal
would lead to critical limitations on a plaintiff’s ability to seek redress.144
134. Id. (quoting Expense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2019)).
135. Id. (quoting Litigation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1017 (9th ed. 2019)).
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Rubio v. BNSF Ry. Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D.N.M 2008), and People
v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242, 248 n.3 (Colo. 1984)); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 36 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000) (citation omitted) (“Allowing lawyers to advance [litigation]
expenses is indistinguishable in substance from allowing contingent fees and has similar
justifications . . . notably enabling poor clients to assert their rights.”).
138. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, L.L.C., 278 P.3d.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 356–57 (citing Alaska Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2004-2, 2004 WL 1853007, at *1
(2004)).
142. See id. at 355–56 (explaining the court’s consideration of both the intent behind the rule
and the plain language).
143. Id. at 357.
144. Id.
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Defendants with deep pockets would be able to prevail simply through
pursuing an appeal and bleeding plaintiffs dry.145
And while Mercantile Adjustment Bureau was decided by a Colorado court
with specific facts, the public policies and concerns underlying the decision
are universal to all jurisdictions. It is poor and indigent clients who would
reap the benefits of a policy such as the one proposed.
C. Settlement Offers & Texas’ Fee-Shifting Statutes
There is an abundance of Texas statutes which allow parties to recover
attorney’s fees. These statutes range across the entire spectrum of civil
practice, and include: shareholder derivative actions,146 declaratory
judgements,147 DTPA claims,148 breach of contract claims,149 the Texas
Property Code,150 the Texas Family Code,151 and various other
applications.152 These statutes all provide for awards of attorney’s fees in
a one-way scenario—either a party wins the case and prevails with the award
or does not. There is, however, a certain provision of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code153 that creates unique problems for this
discussion.
Unlike the previously mentioned provisions, Chapter 42 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code allows for a two-way attorney’s fee award

145. Id. (citing Martin v. Allen, 566 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Colo. 1977) (en banc)).
146. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.561.
147. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009; see Heritage Res., Inc. v. Hill, 104 S.W.3d
612, 617 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (discussing the application of Section 37.009 allowing for
attorney’s fees to be awarded).
148. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
149. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 38.001 (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees for breach of
written or oral contracts); see generally Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P.,
295 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009) (allowing for the recovery practice in principle but making a
distinction based on whether the plaintiff can qualify as a “prevailing party”).
150. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.006 (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees for breach
restrictive covenants).
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.708(c) (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees in divorce
suits); Id. § 106.002 (concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees in suits affecting parent-child
relationships).
152. See 48 Robert P. Schuwerk & Lillian B. Hardwick, Texas Practice Series § 1:17 (2020)
(concerning recoverability of attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in various types of lawsuits).
153. See generally CIV. PRAC. & REM. ch. 42 (regarding the effect of settlements on claims for
monetary relief).
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scenario.154 Under Section 42.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, if a defendant makes a settlement offer in a case which the statute
applies,155 the plaintiff is then faced with the threat of adverse attorney’s
fees should he or she deny the offer.156 Though the goal of the statute is
to encourage litigants to accept otherwise “reasonable” settlement offers,
the risks imposed on the parties favors wealthy litigants. This practice is
further codified under Rule 167 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.157
Rule 167 and Chapter 42 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code apply
to all civil monetary claims filed on or after January 1, 2004,158 but do not
apply to shareholder’s derivative actions, class actions, family cases, actions
against the government, workers’ compensation actions, and justice of the
peace actions.159 Additionally, Rule 167 does not apply to settlement offers
made in arbitration or mediation.160 Rule 167 sprung out of Chapter 42 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code during the legislative wave of
Texas tort reform in 2003.161 State legislators decided that Texas was
bloated by “a general environment of excessive litigation.”162 Their
solution was to pass Rule 167, which was part of House Bill 4. Through
Rule 167 state legislators hoped that parties would be incentivized to either
streamline litigation or seek settlement.163 These incentives were brought
about through the use of fee-shifting mechanisms found within
Chapter 42.164
Contingent fee agreements, such as the one proposed, are most likely to
occur in tort cases as most contract cases are hourly fee agreements.
Furthermore, cases where Chapter 42 of the code apply are more likely to

154. Two-way fee awards, in the simplest terms, means that even if the plaintiff prevails on the
merits of the case, he or she can still end up liable for adverse attorney’s fees. Most one-way provisions
only offer the prospect of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs.
155. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 42.002 (stating the actions to which Chapter 42 does and does
not apply).
156. Id. § 42.004.
157. TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.
158. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 42.002(a), .005.
159. Id. § 42.002(b); Elaine A. Carlson, The New Texas Offer of Settlement Practice—the Newest Steps
in the Tort Reform Dance, 44 THE ADVOC. 105 (2008).
160. TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.7.
161. Bobo v. Varughese, 507 S.W.3d 817, 826 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.).
162. House Comm. on Civ. Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2005).
163. Michael S. Hull et al., Part Two: Detailed Analysis of the Civil Justice Reforms, 36 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 51, 66 (2005).
164. Bobo, 507 S.W.3d at 826.
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be tort cases than other types of cases.165 It is therefore reasonable to
proceed on the notion that Chapter 42 settlements will often apply to many
cases where contingent fee agreements are in use.
Under Chapter 42, if a plaintiff’s final award is less favorable to them by
a margin of 20% or more after rejecting a settlement offer, the plaintiff must
be responsible for adverse litigation costs and attorney’s fees despite
winning at trial.166 This raises completely different types of concerns than
those normally involved in regular contingency scenarios. Unlike the
traditional model, plaintiffs facing a settlement offer covered by Chapter 42
must take on the additional risk of getting a lower-than-expected award
which triggers the statutory penalty.167 A simple scenario detailing this
dilemma is: a plaintiff who seeks one million dollars in monetary damages
will be forced to pay their opponent’s reasonable attorney’s fees if they reject
any settlement offer above $800k.168 While it is not the focus of this
Comment to argue whether $200k is an “unreasonable” margin to reject, it
must be acknowledged that for many plaintiffs their decision to refuse offers
of settlement come with extensive risk even without statutorily imposed
punishments for rejection.
The greater the damages sought the more significant the divide becomes
between what the defendant can low-ball offer to still recoup litigation
costs.169 Deep-pocketed defendants can afford to roll the dice and offer
plaintiff’s low figures in hopes that the threat of adverse attorney’s fees and
litigation costs will be enough to scare their opponents into settling.170
165. Fee-shifting under Chapter 42 of the Code is available only when other statutes do not
provide for it. Fee-shifting in contract cases is covered under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 38.001.
166. Carlson, supra note 159, at 107; CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 42.004(a).
167. See 6 TEXAS TORTS AND REMEDIES § 103.02A (2021) (explaining the details of when
“a party can be held liable for the other party’s litigation costs after the date the offer is made if that
party rejects a reasonable settlement offer . . . .”); 7 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 102.55
(2021) (discussing how to obtain attorney’s fees if settlement negotiations fail).
168. See 6 TEXAS TORTS AND REMEDIES § 103.02A (2021) (providing an example of when the
plaintiff’s “ultimate recovery is less than 80[%] of the rejected offer, or for a defendant if the ultimate
recovery is more than 120[%] of the rejected offer”); CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 42.004(a) (defining what
constitutes a significantly less favorable judgement); 7 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE
§ 102.55 (2021) (describing what a significantly less favorable judgement is).
169. Cf. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement:
A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 18 (1988) (describing the analogous dangers and
problems seen by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68).
170. Cf. Stacy Williams & Gregory F. Burch, Texas’ New Fee-Shifting Statute, 24 THE ADVOC. 18,
19 (2003) (comparing the differing power structures between wealthy and indigent clients); Napier,
supra note 58, at A17 (describing the similar negative effects seen by the English rule).
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Most plaintiffs, on the other hand, bare significant personal risk when
deciding to reject settlement offers covered by Chapter 42. Not only would
they be required to pay their own attorney’s fees and litigation costs, but
they would have to do so for the other side as well—despite prevailing.
Insult would be added to injury as these fees and costs increase due to
extended litigation spent on figuring up what are considered reasonable
attorney’s fees.
All this considered, it is easy to see how indigent clients in Texas might
be led to accept settlement offers out of fear rather than a true meeting of
the minds. An attorney who is confident that he or she can win an award
beyond a 20% margin to a settlement offer would be better enabled to
convince their client to hold out if they were able to guarantee these
statutorily imposed adverse attorney’s fees. Despite claimants getting a 20%
margin of error, “case evaluations by parties and their attorneys often lack
exact precision.”171 Though these fees can only be used as an offset to a
prevailing plaintiff’s award, they have the ability to swallow up a large
percentage of a victorious claimant’s award.172
The harsh effects of the English system have previously been discussed
in this Comment. These fee-shifting statutes are an erosion of the American
system of recovery and pose real risks to indigent clients. Just as the English
system does, these statutes may very well exclude plaintiffs from access to
justice for fear of having to pay the other side’s costs.173 For many indigent
plaintiffs this added cost could prove too discouraging, thus preventing
otherwise meritorious claims from being brought to the court. Many sister
state jurisdictions have fee-shifting statutes, thus making these inherent
threats to poorer plaintiffs a national phenomenon.174
Allowing attorneys to guarantee shifting attorney’s fees is a viable way of
striking balance between the English and American systems. Defendants
would still be incentivized to make reasonable offers of settlement with the
prospect of remuneration of costs upon rejection while plaintiffs would be

171. Sherman, supra note 58, at 1887–88.
172. Cf. Rowe, Jr. & Vidmar, supra note 165, at 18 (describing the analogous dangers and
problems seen by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 168–69 (1984) (predicting negative effects of
implementing fee-shifting arrangements).
173. Napier, supra note 58, at A17; see Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 ABA J. 54, 57
(1992) (discussing the financial impact the English system has on meritorious plaintiffs).
174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (creating a federal procedure for fee-shifting); see also Carlson, supra
note 159, at 104 n.11 (detailing the various other states with some form of fee-shifting statute).
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insulated from the threats of low-ball offers. This type of practice should
once again come down to informed consent between client and counsel
rather than a carte blanche violation of ethics rules. The situations and
motivations of settlement negotiation are often nuanced, and so too should
be an attorney’s ability to respond to them. Under the current Texas Rules
of Professional Conduct, clients involved in Rule 167 negotiations face a
difficult decision either way.
In exchange for higher contingency percentages, attorneys would be
better enabled to convince clients that their case is worth substantially more
than what the other side is offering. Clients who fail to get beyond the
statutory margins could simply receive an offset from their attorney should
they still prevail at court despite receiving a lower-than-expected award.175
It is entirely admitted that this might put attorneys at odds with the will of
the government by hindering settlement. However, it would still be the
attorney who bears the risk of his intervention, not the client.
D. Expense of Litigation
When considering the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
in unison, the most logical solution to the issue of whether an attorney can
ethically guarantee the threat of adverse attorney’s fee awards comes down
to the nature of the expense. In a more simplistic Occam’s Razor176 style
solution, counselors can turn once again to Rule 1.08(d) to find illumination.
Under the current Texas rules an attorney is allowed to guarantee the
“expenses of litigation[,] . . . the repayment of which may be contingent on
the outcome of the matter.”177 And for indigent clients no repayment is
necessary at all.178
And while it is still true that attorney’s fees are generally unrecoverable in
Texas absent a contractual or statutory provision,179 this is not always the
175. In jurisdictions such as California, which allows for defendants to actually recover costs
from losing plaintiffs, the guaranteeing of shifting attorney’s fees would better support the public policy
goals behind contingent fee agreements. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
176. Made in reference to the oft quoted fourteeth century maxim “the simpler explanation of
an entity is to be preferred.” Occam’s Razor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/Occams-razor [https://perma.cc/272R-P3VN].
177. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(1), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A.
178. See id. at R. 1.08(d)(2) (allowing an indigent’s attorney to cover attorney’s fees and litigation
costs on behalf of client).
179. Baja Energy, Inc. v. Ball, 669 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1984, no writ) (citing
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967)).

2021]

Comment

215

case. There are instances of Texas and federal180 courts allowing attorney’s
fees to be considered expenses of litigation. The Texas Supreme Court has
emphatically stated in Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds181 that “Texas law is clear
that attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the prosecution or defense of a
claim, although ‘compensatory in that they help make a claimant whole,’ are
not damages.”182 And though the court in Ortiz relied on the general rule
of recovery stated in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,183
the court has stated, in the interim of those two cases, in Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development & Research Corp.184 that “[o]ur
statement, considered without reference to the facts of the case, could be
read out of context as generally precluding recovery of attorney’s fees for
prosecuting or defending a suit. It was not intended to extend so far.”185
Thus, recovering attorney’s fees as a matter of course should not be
classified as damages. Instead, where statute permits, adverse attorney’s fees
ought to be considered part of the costs and expenses of litigation.186 All
things considered, a strong argument exists that adverse187 attorney’s fees
are firmly within the class of expenses which Rules 1.08(d)(1) and (2) permit
the guarantee of. Once again there is no clear bright-line answer to the
180. See S. Nat. Bank of Houston v. Crateo, 458 F.2d 688, 698 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying the Erie
doctrine with Texas law, allowing the award of attorney’s fees as an expense of litigation on principle,
but reversed for the trial court to determine the reasonable amount.).
181. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019) (rehearing denied Dec. 13, 2019).
182. Id. at 135 (quoting In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex. 2013));
see In Re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518, 529 (Tex. 2018) (defining damages as a compensation for a
loss); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte, 497 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that compensatory
damages are not the same as civil penalties, especially in light of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
ch. 41); Huff v. Fid. Union Life Ins. Co., 312 S.W.2d 493, 501 (Tex. 1958) (treating attorney’s fees
awards as more of a penalty than an actual damages claim); Sherrick v. Wyland, 37 S.W. 345, 345 (Tex.
Civ App. 1896, no writ) (“[F]ees of counsel, incurred in prosecuting a suit for or defending against a
wrong, are not ordinarily recoverable as actual damages, because they are not considered proximate
results of such wrong.”).
183. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1967).
184. Akin, Gump, Straus, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Rsch. Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106
(Tex. 2009).
185. Id. at 120.
186. This position applies to attorney’s fee awards that are not treated as damages by statute.
See James M. Stanton, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 243, 248–49 (2004) (reviewing the exceptions Texas
courts recognize to the American rule that both parties pay for its own court costs “unless provided
for by statute or by contract between the parties . . . .”).
187. It must be noted that the ethical legitimacy of the practice being recommended in this
Comment does not apply to one’s own attorney’s fees. These have already been provided for by statute
and are regulated by the rules of professional conduct. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A.
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question presented that can be found in case law or statutes. Not only is
guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees an incredibly rare—or completely
nonexistent—practice in Texas, it is one that is equally rare in other states.
Authority on this issue is sparse, and indirect at best. That said, lack of
scholarship on the issue should not be deemed adequate grounds for
dismissing the importance of the question presented.
The very same ethical requirements that pertain to all contingent fee
agreements would still apply to guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fee
awards.188 Any fee that an attorney guaranteed would still have to be
conscionable.189 The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit the charging of unreasonable fees.190 But the practice of
guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees is in fact the exact opposite—the client
does not get charged these fees. Whatever extra award percentage an
attorney would get from this extra risk would still need to be conscionable
under the rules. So long as a competent lawyer can form “a reasonable belief
that the fee is reasonable” there is no conflict with Rule 1.04.191 The rule
gives us multiple reasonableness factors that we may consider when
analyzing any type of fee.192
Nothing about guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees would negatively
impact the time and labor required,193 the skill required to carry out the
legal work correctly,194 or the difficulty and novelty of the questions
involved.195 Guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fee awards would in no way
lead to a rise of conflicts of interests.196 The amount of attorney’s fees to
be guaranteed would be on a case-by-case basis, and thus would be unlikely
to raise the overall percentage “customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services[.]”197 However, like any contingency fee agreement, the
contingent nature of the adverse attorney’s fee award guarantee and the

188. Id. at R. 1.08(d).
189. Id. at R. 1.04.
190. Id. at R. 1.04(a) (requiring that all contingent fee agreements be conscionable).
191. Id. (“A fee is unconscionable if a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that
the fee is reasonable”).
192. Id. at R. 1.04(b).
193. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(1).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(2).
197. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(3).
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necessary events to trigger the contingency198 should be laid out in
writing.199
Looking at the situation realistically, should a client be assessed adverse
attorney’s fees they must pay them either way. This practice would not
change this. However, if these adverse attorney’s fees were treated as an
offset to a client’s own attorney’s fees in an “unsuccessful outcome,”200 it
would better serve the interests of the client if they did not have to end up
paying two sets of attorney’s fees. If an attorney is comfortable with risking
a lower payout due to an offset of adverse attorney’s fees this should be left
up to them. This is the way in which contingent fee agreements are handled
in Alabama. In 1995, the Alabama Supreme Court amended their equivalent
to Texas Rule 1.08 to expressly provide that in a percentage award fee
agreement “a lawyer may pay, for his own account, court costs and expenses
of litigation. The fee paid to the attorney from the proceeds of the action
may include an amount equal to such costs and expenses incurred.”201
The higher the total adverse attorney award, the less money that ends up
in the pockets of the plaintiff. Guaranteeing these adverse attorney’s fees,
and treating them as an offset of one’s own fees as an expense of litigation
simply allows plaintiffs to keep at least some measurable remainder of their
awards. However, it is important to note that the increased percentage for
successful actions involving the threat of adverse attorney’s fees should not
be greater than the actual percentage that adverse attorney’s fees would be
of the plaintiff’s award, i.e., if the adverse attorney’s fees were 5% of the
overall award the plaintiff’s attorney should not be allowed to charge much
more than 5% extra for taking on this risk. The issue becomes predicting
what the percentage of adverse fees will be at the offset. However, language
to the effect of “such additional fee shall not be ___% higher than what the
actual reasonable expenses of the opposing side shall be” could serve as a
possible example of how to contract around this issue.

198. Id. at R. 1.04(b)(8).
199. Id. at R. 1.04(c).
200. Here the term “unsuccessful” requires a looser meaning than what it is typical. Unlike in
normal contingent-fee agreements, which assess success based on whether the defendant is found
liable, the term “success” here can be more mailable. Success can be determined by a certain pecuniary
threshold that a client wishes to reach, or even an adverse attorney’s fee award figure that they wish to
avoid.
201. Joseph W. Blackburn, Deductibility of Litigation Expenses Paid by Alabama Attorney’s, 67 ALA.
LAW. 445, 447 (2006).
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As with any other fee, attorneys would not be allowed to use the
guaranteeing of adverse attorney’s fees as a means to solicit prospective
clients through advertising.202 Attorney’s would still be prohibited from
utilizing any sort of practice that constitutes barratry under the laws of the
State of Texas.203 While it is true that under the current Texas rules
repayment is required, this has not always been the case. The Texas rule is
already more forgiving in its scope than the ABA equivalent.204 Unlike
many states, the Texas rules expressly include the ability to guarantee the
expenses of litigation for any client, regardless of ability to pay.205
As for indigent clients, Texas—as well as most states—do not require
that advanced expenses of litigation be repaid.206 The practical impact of
treating adverse attorney’s fee awards as an expense of litigation would be
that indigent clients would be completely insulated from risk in a contingent
situation. The drafters of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct207, as well as the Model Code of Professional Conduct208,
acknowledged this.
202. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03 (regulating the manner in which
attorneys are allowed to solicit clients and prohibiting an exchange of anything of value to gain
prospective clients except in very limited situations).
203. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(9) (stating that a lawyer shall
not “engage in conduct that constitutes barratry”).
204. See Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to The Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, 27A HOUS. L. REV. 1, 136 (1990) (dissecting the complexities of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct).
205. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(1) (“[A] lawyer may
advance or guarantee court costs, expenses of litigation or administrative proceedings, and reasonably
necessary medical and living expenses, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of
the matter.”), with ARIZ. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs
and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”),
and COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs and expenses
of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”), and FLORIDA
RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.8(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of
litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”), and KY. RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.130(1.8)(e)(1) (“[A] lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”).
206. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(2) (“[A] lawyer
representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”),
with ALA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (“[A] lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”), and ARIZ. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.8(e)(2) (“[A] lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation
on behalf of the client.”), and COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (“[A] lawyer representing
an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client”).
207. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(2).
208. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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Ethically there is little ground to support the notion that allowing adverse
attorney’s fees to be guaranteed as a cost of litigation would somehow lead
to a rise in predatory contingent fee agreements. Ethical attorneys who take
the risk of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees create two types of scenarios:
(1) the attorney would be more likely to counsel their clients on a losing case
to reach settlement; (2) the attorney would be even more incentivized to win
the case. Neither of these scenarios compromises the ethics of an attorney’s
actions under the rules. Conspiracy fears that this would further fuel the
fires of drawn-out litigation are based in conjecture rather than concrete
data. What is concrete however, is that the expenses of litigation all too
often keep meritorious cases from ever seeing the light of a courtroom
because one of the parties is terrified of the economic impacts of litigation.
VI. THE REAL-WORLD IMPACT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Having established the philosophical and somewhat arcane209
foundation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, a more
pragmatic approach would help provide a broader analysis of the subject. It
is all good and well to demonstrate the historical roots of the argument
proposed, but this does little to further the likelihood of use by practicing
attorneys. The practice of guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees is a subject
which has little to no scholarship before now. An attorney wishing to utilize
the practice has little to go on to keep from landing in front of a disciplinary
board.
A. Eliminate or Reduce Third-Party Litigation Financing
Allowing counselors to guarantee adverse attorney’s fees awards will
hopefully reduce or eliminate all or part of the market for third-party
litigation financing. Since the inception of the Texas rules an entire industry
of private lenders for litigation costs has sprung up, with estimated output
totaling in excess of $1 billion loaned out to plaintiffs alone.210 It is true
that similar to contingent fee agreements private third-party financing allows
plaintiffs who otherwise would not be able to afford legal fees the

209. While it is true that discussing the Magna Carta and the Texas rules in the same context
might be a bit esoteric, this only goes to show just how ancient the values embodied in this paper’s
argument are. A deep river of history flows throughout the body of this proposal, and the goal of
opening the doors of justice to all who have a worthy cause lie at the heart of it.
210. George J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implication of Third-Party Litigation
Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 645 (2012).

220

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:186

opportunity to pay for an attorney.211 However, unlike contingent fee
agreements with attorneys there are few, if any, ethical considerations
enforced upon lenders to protect clients. Instead of involving the ethical,
moral, and fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, clients are
turning more and more towards arm’s-length transactions with lending
institutions who value profit over results.
An attorney’s first and most solemn interest is always that of the client.
And allowing them to hop in bed with a sparsely regulated,212 selfinterested business to be able bring suit is a betrayal of that obligation when
there is a more equitable solution within our grasp. Texas Disciplinary Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.04 already bars attorneys from taking advantage
of their clients. These lenders on the other hand are not subject to
Rule 1.04. There is little to keep third-party financiers from taking
advantage of clients in their contracts to pay back their loans with a
percentage of their awards. Meanwhile, duties separately owed to clients by
their attorney will always be a greater protection than individual regulations.
Furthermore, if an attorney takes their percentage of the award and the bank
takes theirs, what is there really left to make the client whole? This
Comment has highlighted the fact that under the American system the
parties are not completely made whole. Allowing third-party litigation
financiers to take part of client’s awards further exacerbate the situation—
not to mention it is a near textbook definition of champerty.
B. Amend the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct
One possible way of creating a solution is to amend the Texas Rules of
Professional Conduct. Hopefully this Comment has proven that
guaranteeing adverse attorney’s fees is ethical—now it must be legal as well.
Adding in a provision in Rule 1.08(d)(1) to allow for this is one possible
path, and one that ought to be given strong consideration. If one takes a
practical look at the term “expense of litigation,” how could attorney’s fees
not be part of it? The Model Rules allow the advancement of expenses of
litigation because “the advances are practically indistinguishable from
contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts.”213 Thus, changing

211. Id. at 646.
212. See e.g., Susan L. Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 57 (2004) (highlighting the fact the entire
litigation finance industry is unregulated).
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
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the Texas rules requires great consideration by the drafters of the State Bar.
However, incorporating language to fix one problem might create another.
C. Texas Commission on Professional Ethics
The more prudent option might well be within the power of the Texas
Commission on Professional Ethics. Should a case involving these issues
come before the Commission, it would be possible for that body to simply
state that the suggested practice of guaranteeing a client’s adverse attorney’s
fees comports with the Texas rules. This would avoid having to go through
the effort and risk involved in changing the Texas Rules of Professional
Conduct themselves.
VII. CONCLUSION
Allowing attorneys to guarantee all or a portion of any adverse attorney’s
fees awarded against their client is an ethical solution to many problems.
Chief among these solutions is the expansion of the open courts doctrine to
worthy claimants. The sanctity of contract law ought to prevail in an
otherwise ethical situation, and Texas should make it clear that this practice
is ethical. Those who would subvert the ethical parameters of contingent
fee agreements would likely do so all the same without addition of any
guarantees of adverse attorney’s fees to the state rules. This is something
the bar is already equipped to handle, and it is a legitimate issue. However,
the bigger problem involved is that otherwise meritorious parties either
forego bringing suit or accept a settlement out of fear of the costs and
expenses of litigation. What good is reaching the marble rooms of justice if
you are quickly forced out of them by pecuniary limitations? Guaranteeing
the threat of adverse attorney’s fees is a legitimate and practical means of
assisting clients to navigate the financially murky waters of litigation and
should be widely accepted.

